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DEARLY DEPARTED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE  
DEPARTURE BAR UNDER MENDIOLA V. HOLDER AND 
WILLIAM V. GONZALES 
Daniel E. Bonilla* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 29, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
officials removed1 then-green-card holder Vakhtang Pruidze based on 
a state conviction for possession of a controlled substance.2  Thirteen 
days later, the state court set aside the conviction, and Pruidze moved 
to reopen3 his removal proceedings.4  The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA or “Board”), however, denied the motion because Pruidze 
no longer physically resided in the United States, and thus the BIA held 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion.5  Ultimately, however, the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BIA cannot 
constrict its statutory jurisdiction based on the Attorney General’s 
regulations or its own decisions.6 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, 
University of Louisville.  I would like to thank Professor Lori Nessel for her guidance 
throughout the development of this Comment, Megan Bedell for her invaluable 
suggestions and assistance, and the Law Review members who helped prepare this 
Comment for publication. 
 1 Until the passing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, the term “deportation” referred to aliens who had 
been removed from the country.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–
89 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); see Jennifer M. 
Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 140 n.28 
(2009).  IIRIRA consolidated the then-separate “exclusion” and “deportation” 
proceedings under one all-encompassing label of “removal” proceedings.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1324c(e) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546(a), 1015(e)–(f) (2006). 
 2 Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 3 “A motion to reopen is based on ‘facts or evidence not available at the time of the 
original decision’ [and] must be supported by affidavits or other evidence.”  RACHEL E. 
ROSENBLOOM ET AL., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE AT BOSTON COLL., POST-
DEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTRPracticeAdvis
ory2010FINAL_APPENDIX.pdf (quoting Patel v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 
2004)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (2006). 
 4 Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 235.  
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 237–38. 
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On May 7, 2004, the BIA, within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
granted Rafael Martinez Coyt thirty days to depart the United States 
voluntarily.7  By fault of his former attorney, however, Coyt did not 
learn of the court’s ruling until October 2004.8  After being removed, 
Coyt filed a motion for the BIA to reissue the decision in order to grant 
a new voluntary departure period.9  The BIA denied the motion on 
grounds that Coyt’s motion had been withdrawn once he departed the 
country.10  After reviewing the regulation at issue, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a motion is not withdrawn when the alien has been 
involuntarily removed.11 
On April 9, 2009, DHS officials removed Jesus Contreras-
Bocanegra after the BIA denied his motion to cancel his removal.12  
Thereafter, Contreras filed a timely motion to reopen based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.13  Once again, the BIA denied 
Contreras’s motion; this time, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction 
due to his departure.14  The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that based 
on its prior rulings, the regulation at issue divests the BIA of 
jurisdiction to entertain such motions, even when they are timely.15 
The above-referenced cases are only three examples of how 
different circuit courts of appeals interpret post-departure bars under 
the Code of Federal Regulations.  For example, immigrants who have 
been subjected to removal proceedings in New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Indiana, or Maryland, but are currently residing in another country, are 
permitted to file motions to reopen regardless of whether they are 
currently the subject of removal proceedings or whether the U.S. 
government has already removed them.16  Even immigrants who have 
                                                          
 7 Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 8 Id. at 904. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 907. 
 12 Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 13 Id. at 1171. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 1172. 
 16 The Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, held that the regulatory post-
departure bar conflicts with Congress’s clear intent regarding motions to reopen.  
Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Second Circuit, of 
which New York is a part, has held that the BIA cannot constrict its own jurisdiction.  
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011).  The court in Luna, however, limited its 
holding to statutory motions.  Id. at 102.  Ohio is located within the Sixth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction and permits aliens to file motions to reopen their proceedings after they 
have departed because the court has ruled that the BIA cannot constrict its statutory 
jurisdiction by regulations or its own decisions.  Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235, 
237–38 (6th Cir. 2011).  Indiana, which is within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
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been subjected to removal proceedings in Alaska but are currently 
living in another country, so long as their removal was involuntarily 
and/or they are not currently subject to removal proceedings, may file 
a motion to reopen.17  Unfortunately, the regulatory departure bar 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) prohibits immigrants who have been 
subjected to removal proceedings in Maine, Texas, Colorado, or 
Florida, among other states, from moving to reopen their proceedings 
once they have departed the country.18  This Comment sets forth that 
such inconsistent interpretations of federal law and regulations 
threaten to undermine the important concepts of uniformity and just 
application of law in American jurisprudence. 
The lack of uniformity in application of the departure bar is of 
increasing concern due to the growing annual number of removed 
aliens in recent years.19  In fiscal year 2010, 392,862 aliens were 
removed,20 more than double the number of removals in 1999.21  The 
continuous increase in the number of immigrants removed each year 
emphasizes the significant implications stemming from the fact that 
                                                                                                                                      
permits aliens to file motions to reopen or reconsider for the same reasons articulated 
in the Sixth Circuit.  Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2010).  
Maryland, which is within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits aliens to file 
motions to reopen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) regardless of whether they 
are physically present in the United States.  William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
 17 Alaska, which falls within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits an alien to 
reopen a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) if the alien moves to reopen after 
the removal order is final or after being involuntarily removed.  Coyt v. Holder, 593 
F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 18 Each state falls under the jurisdictions of the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Eleventh 
Circuits, respectively.  See Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Mendiola v Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 502 (2010); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying upon 
Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2003)); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
284 F. App’x 798, 799 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–42 
(1st Cir. 2007); Ablahad v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 19 See generally Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal 
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1999) (describing different aspects of the 
interplay between federal immigration law and state criminal law).   
 20 Stephen Dinan, More Criminal Aliens Deported Last Year, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2010, at A1; see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Deportations Rise Under Obama, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 2, 2010, at A32. 
 21 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf 
(noting that there were 183,114 deportations in 1999).  See generally Lenni B. Benson, 
Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process 
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007) 
(discussing how litigation has increased in light of Congress’s narrowing and 
elimination of prior forms of relief). 
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immigrants unfortunate enough to have resided in particular states in 
the United States will be forever barred from reopening their cases, 
despite valid grounds for doing so. 
The situation is further compounded by the fact that most 
criminal convictions result in mandatory detention.22  Such a practice, 
in conjunction with the rising number of deportations, raises new 
concerns.  For example, in Mendiola v. Holder, DHS officials transferred 
the petitioner, Mendiola, to an immigration detention facility in 
another circuit court’s jurisdiction.23  The immigration judge (IJ) 
denied Mendiola’s motion for a change of venue,24 and, ultimately, the 
court denied his motion to reopen due to the regulatory post-
departure bar, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the 
motion.25  This practice implicates serious concerns for aliens facing 
removal proceedings in this country because DHS officials, or 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, can transfer an 
alien to a jurisdiction that is more favorable to their position;26 as a 
practical matter, DHS officials can engage in forum shopping.27 
In order to ensure that litigants are afforded adequate legal 
protections, the Legislature has created several safeguards in the 
judicial system.  For instance, the United States Supreme Court 
recently noted in Kucana v. Holder that “[t]he motion to reopen is an 
‘important safeguard’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful 
disposition’ of immigration proceedings.”28  Courts should not subject 
such an important legal right to chance—a chance that a deportable 
alien lives in a jurisdiction that permits him or her to file a motion to 
                                                          
 22 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 389 (2002) (“Furthermore, Congress has 
ordered the mandatory detention of most non-citizens whose criminal convictions 
render them deportable.”). 
 23 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009); Mendiola v. Gonzales, 
189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 24 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 25 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1311.  
 26 Id. 
 27 See RICHARD L. SKINNER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO DETAINEE TRANSFERS 1 (2009), available 
at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc 
=1016%7C6715%7C16871%7C31048%7C30690 (“ICE transfers detainees to other 
detention facilities to prepare for final removal, reduce overcrowding, or meet the 
specialized needs of the detainee.”).  An alien’s counsel may also engage in forum 
shopping, as noted by Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit.  Immigration Litigation Reduction: 
Hearing on H.R. 109-537 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49 8 (2006) 
(statement of the Honorable Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals). 
 28 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 
1, 18 (2008)). 
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reopen after departing the country.  Because “this conflict involves an 
issue of significant practical importance,”29 it is imperative that the 
immigration courts provide uniformity in the application of the 
regulatory departure bar throughout the country. 
It is also clear that Congress’s intent in enacting the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)30 was 
to make motions to reopen available to immigrants inside and outside 
of the country.31  This Comment proposes that Congress should modify 
the INA to include language clearly indicating that an alien’s 
geographic location at the time of filing of a motion to reopen or 
reconsider removal proceedings should not bar the immigration courts 
of jurisdiction to hear such motions.  Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that amending the INA’s statutory language to explicitly 
grant immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an alien’s motion 
to reopen regardless of whether the alien is within or without the 
country would provide uniformity in this context by resolving the 
current circuit conflicts while also remaining true to the IIRIRA’s 
statutory purpose.  Part II of this Comment begins with background 
information on the history of immigration law in the United States by 
discussing the INA before the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996.  Part III 
focuses on the state of immigration law after the IIRIRA’s enactment.  
In Part IV, this Comment provides a brief overview of three BIA cases, 
each of which address different departure bar issues.  This Part 
provides insight into some of the background matters that are 
analyzed in the circuit cases discussed throughout this Comment.  Part 
V analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales and the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Mendiola v. Holder.  In addition, this Part 
illustrates the lack of uniformity in U.S. circuit courts of appeals by 
noting the differences in departure bar jurisprudence found in several 
different cases.  Then, Part VI provides an argument for modification or 
abolishment of the regulatory departure bars.  Lastly, Part VII 
discusses possible solutions to the lack of uniformity by proposing an 
amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) that would render all 
currently phrased regulatory departure bars invalid and thus 
                                                          
 29 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th 
Cir. 2009) ( No. 08-9565), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/09-1378_pet.pdf.   
 30 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 31 See Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘The intent of 
Congress is clear’ in that ‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would be able to pursue 
relief after departing from the United States.’”) (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 
906 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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inapplicable to departed aliens who file motions to reopen their 
proceedings. 
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE IIRIRA 
This Comment provides the historical background behind the 
origins of the regulatory departure bars to better illustrate their 
current varying interpretations.  Congress enacted the first general 
immigration statute in 1882, which “imposed a head tax of 50 cents 
[per immigrant] and excluded idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons 
likely to become a public charge.”32  Also in 1882, Congress passed the 
controversial Chinese Exclusion Act.33  A codification of the general 
immigration law occurred in 1891,34 and by 1893, Congress enacted a 
provision for the establishment of boards to determine the 
admissibility of arriving immigrants.35  By 1903, the legislature revised 
the statutory provisions to enumerate rejections of certain types of 
immigrants.36  In 1907, Congress added additional exclusions for the 
feebleminded and persons who had committed crimes involving moral 
turpitude, among others.37  Essentially, Congress aimed to disallow 
certain types of individuals whom Congress deemed to be of unsound 
mind or character from entering the United States. 
Also in 1907, Congress created the Dillingham Commission to 
investigate the immigration system of the United States.38  Although 
the commission’s report included recommendations to improve the 
country’s immigration system, Congress did not adopt any such 
legislation until 1917 when it passed a comprehensive revision of the 
                                                          
 32 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[2] (2010); see Act of 
Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. 
 33 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by the Magnuson Act, ch. 
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (prohibiting the immigration of Chinese Laborers in the 
United States); see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination 
and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (“The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first Asian Exclusion Law, and the one that generated 
sthe most contemporary controversy.”). 
 34 While Congress and different states had already enacted legislation relating to 
immigration prior to 1891, see Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a 
Comprehensive Approach That Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to 
Secure the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 268–69 (2006), the codification in 1891 
“provided the first general immigration law applying to all aliens entering the United 
States,” Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21 
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 131, 146 (1997). 
 35 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32. 
 36 See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (repealed 1907) excluding 
epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists, among others). 
 37 See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898. 
 38 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32. 
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immigration laws over the veto of President Wilson.39  This 
comprehensive revision expanded the powers of immigration officers 
and conferred discretionary authority to admit certain barred 
groups.40  After World War I ended in 1918, immigration began to rise 
in the United States, with some years registering over a million 
immigrants per year.41  This influx of immigrants ultimately resulted in 
the Quota Law of 1921.42 
The Acts of 1917 and 1921 were the primary components of 
immigration policy until the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which 
expanded the Attorney General’s power.43  This Act delegated to the 
Attorney General “broad authority to establish rules and regulations to 
enforce the nation’s immigration laws.”44  Pursuant to regulations, the 
Attorney General established the BIA in 1940; the regulations 
“authorized the Board to ‘issue orders of deportation’; ‘consider and 
determine appeals’; and resolve motions for ‘reconsideration, 
reargument or reopening of a case after the issuance of a final 
decision.’”45  Then, in 1952, Congress enacted the INA, also known as 
the McCarran-Walter Act.46  The INA further expanded the Attorney 
General’s authority by granting the Attorney General the power to 
administer and enforce the Act.47  It also “authorized him to ‘establish 
                                                          
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5(placing numerical limitations on 
how many immigrants of certain nationalities could be permitted in the United States), 
repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952). 
 43 Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Internal Security Act of 
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987. 
 44 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 45 Id. at 654–55; see Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and 
Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503  
(Sept. 4, 1940).  In 1913, the immigration-related federal agency established in 1891  
was transferred to the newly created Department of Labor and divided 
into the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.  The 
two bureaus were combined in 1933 . . . and . . . named the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) . . . .  [In] March 2003, the functions of 
the INS were transferred to DHS.   
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 n.3 (citations omitted).  The provisions established under the 
Alien Registration Act were further enlarged by the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. 
L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as amended in scattered section of 50 
U.S.C.). 
 46 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C.).  The Act was co-named after its sponsors Senator Pat McCarran and 
Congressman Francis Walter.  Richard Boswell, Immigration Law: Crafting True 
Immigration Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2008).   
 47 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655.  
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such regulations . . . as he deem[ed] necessary for carrying out [that] 
authority.’”48  Subsequently, the “Attorney General promulgated a 
series of regulations defining the ‘[a]ppellate jurisdiction’ of the BIA 
and the ‘[p]owers of the Board.’”49  Regulations promulgated at this 
time included motions to reopen and motions for reconsideration of 
Board decisions.50  More importantly, these regulations also included 
the first version of the regulatory departure bar, which stated that “[a] 
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on 
behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings 
subsequent to his departure from the United States.”51 
In the 1954 case In re G-y-B, the BIA upheld the departure bar as a 
jurisdictional limitation of its power to consider a motion to reopen.52  
The Board’s holding clearly validated the regulatory departure bar.  
Then, in 1958, the Attorney General revised the regulations to include 
sua sponte authority for the BIA to reopen proceedings and reconsider 
its own decisions.53  Congress also made changes by amending the INA 
in 1961 to include provisions relating to judicial review of BIA 
decisions.54  One such provision modeled the regulatory departure bar 
and stated that “[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be 
reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed from the United 
States after the issuance of the order.”55  Congress’s amendment 
codified the departure bar.56 
The Attorney General’s regulations pertaining to motions to 
reopen remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990.57  This 
Act authorized the Attorney General to 
                                                          
 48 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting § 103(a), 66 Stat. at 
173). 
 49 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17 
Fed. Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b), (d) 
(1952)). 
 50 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656 n.4. 
 51 Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17 Fed. Reg. at 11,475 (originally 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (containing an 
identical current limit on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings before the BIA); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (containing an 
identical current limit on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings before an IJ); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 52 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954). 
 53 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 54 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996); see Zhang, 
617 F.3d at 656. 
 55 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964) (repealed 1996); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 56 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656; see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). 
 57 Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978; see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
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issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which 
motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings, 
which regulations [should] include a limitation on the number of 
such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the 
filing of such motions.58 
Ultimately, the Attorney General followed this directive and 
promulgated regulations that permitted aliens to file only “one motion 
to reopen within 90 days.”59  The revised regulations, however, 
retained the IJ and the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen 
proceedings.60 
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER THE IIRIRA 
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, which codified “some—but 
not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations regarding motions 
to reopen.”61  Included within the statute were the Attorney General’s 
regulatory numerical and temporal limitations for motions to reopen 
or reconsider.62  Congress, however, did not include the departure bar 
or regulations that granted sua sponte authority to the IJ and BIA in the 
statute.63  Instead, the IIRIRA repealed the originally codified 
departure bar in such a manner that an alien’s departure from the 
United States no longer foreclosed that alien’s legal ability to seek 
judicial review of a BIA order.64 
The Attorney General specifically addressed the IIRIRA’s repeal of 
the INA’s codified departure bar by promulgating new regulations on 
March 6, 1997, which included both a departure bar and sua sponte 
authority for the BIA to consider motions to reopen.65  According to the 
Attorney General, “‘[n]o provision of the [IIRIRA] supports reversing 
the long established rule that a motion to reopen . . . cannot be made in 
                                                          
 58 § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. at 5066 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)); 
see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 59 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 13 (2008)). 
 60 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(a), 3.23(b)(1) (2000); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
 61 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657; Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–89 
(1996). 
 62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion to 
reopen proceedings under this section,” which must generally be filed “within 90 days 
of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal”).  For the text of the 
current departure bar see infra Part VII. 
 63 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of 
Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10.312, 
10.330–31 (Mar. 6, 1997) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d) (1997) then 
subsequently moved to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2009)); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 
1003.23(b)(1) (2011); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
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immigration proceedings by or on behalf of a person after that 
person’s departure from the United States.’”66  These regulations, 
promulgated by the Attorney General, are still in effect today.  
Congress, however, has not amended the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A) or 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) to include these 
regulations or any jurisdictional bar to considering motions to reopen 
or reconsider by aliens after they have departed from the county. 
VI. BIA’S REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE 
In order to understand the reasoning behind the BIA’s departure 
bar holdings in subsequent circuit court of appeals opinions, this Part 
will briefly highlight three major BIA cases analyzing post-departure 
bars. 
A. In re G-y-B 
In 1954, the Board in In re G-y-B upheld the first version of the 
1952 regulatory post-departure bar.67  The IJ originally excluded the 
petitioner under the INA on grounds that he was affiliated with the 
Communist party of a foreign state.68  Thus, on August 14, 1953, 
petitioner departed the country and subsequently filed a motion to 
reopen and reconsider on November 24, 1953.69  Although the 
petitioner included new facts to support his claim that he should not 
have been excluded, the Board ruled that it was “without jurisdiction 
to act on the motion.”70  The Board applied the post-departure bar 
under 8 C.F.R. § 6.12,71 which in pertinent part stated, 
Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of 
deportation proceedings subsequent to the taking of an appeal but 
prior to a decision thereon shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal 
and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent as 
though no appeal had been taken.72 
For this reason, the Board dismissed petitioner’s motions.73 
                                                          
 66 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,312). 
 67 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 68 In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 159. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 159–60. 
 72 8 C.F.R. § 6.12 (1952). 
 73 In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 160. 
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B. In re Armendarez-Mendez 
The Board continued upholding its ruling in In re G-y-B 
throughout the years.  In 2008, the BIA once again upheld its 
longstanding application of the regulatory departure bar in In re 
Armendarez-Mendez.74  Government officials removed respondent from 
the United States on December 11, 2000.75  Then, nearly five and one-
half years later, respondent filed a motion for the court to reopen his 
proceedings sua sponte.76  Having found the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) applicable, the Board denied his motion.77  Respondent 
subsequently filed a petition of review to the Fifth Circuit.78  In light of 
the holding in the Ninth Circuit’s case Lin v. Gonzales,79 the Fifth Circuit 
remanded respondent’s matter to the BIA to consider the questions 
raised in his case.80 
On remand, in a lengthy opinion, the Board detailed the history 
and analyzed the different interpretations of the regulatory departure 
bar and the validity of the regulation as applied in different federal 
circuit courts.81  The Board first reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Lin and concluded that its reasoning was unpersuasive because 
“[w]hen the departure bar rule is examined in context, we believe it 
clearly applies to removed aliens.”82  The Board then detailed its 
disagreement with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in William v. Gonzales.83  
In the Board’s view, the Act, when taken as a whole, draws a distinction 
between aliens who have departed after being ordered removed and 
those who have remained in the United States.84  Ultimately, the Board 
                                                          
 74 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 660 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 75 Id. at 646, 647. 
 76 See id. at 646. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that so long as 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) is explicitly phrased in the present tense, an IJ has jurisdiction to 
consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien).  
 80 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646. 
 81 Id. at 647–60.    
 82 Id. at 651. 
 83 Id. at 654–60; William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the INA’s statutory language always invalidates regulatory departure bars); see 
discussion of William infra Part V.A. 
 84 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 655 (“[The William court] observed 
that  
[8 U.S.C. §] 240(c)(7) of the Act does not expressly distinguish between aliens who 
have departed the United States after being ordered removed and those who have 
remained.”).  The Board also disagreed with the majority in William because it did not 
find that the physical presence requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 240(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) 
implicitly invalidated the departure bar.  Id. at 658; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) 
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explained that it was bound by the Fourth Circuit’s precedent to apply 
the William holding to BIA cases involving post-departure bar issues; 
however, the Board explicitly noted that such rulings would be limited 
exclusively to the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.85  The Board further 
explained, albeit in dicta,86 that “the departure bar regulation deprives 
the BIA of jurisdiction to consider statutory motions to reopen after 
the movant’s departure from the United States.”87  In other 
jurisdictions, the BIA concluded that it will continue to uphold the 
validity of the regulatory departure bars.88 
C. In re Bulnes-Nolasco 
In 2009, the BIA restricted the scope of the departure-bar rule in 
In re Bulnes-Nolasco with regard to a motion to reopen to rescind an 
order.89  The court held the departure bar inapplicable to aliens who 
have departed the country while under an outstanding order of 
deportation or removal issued in absentia.90  Respondent, a native and 
citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection on 
July 28, 1996.91  Then, in August 1996, the DHS served respondent with 
an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing.92  Respondent, 
however, did not appear for her deportation hearing two years later, at 
which point the IJ ordered her deported in absentia.93  Nine years later, 
on December 7, 2007, respondent filed a motion to reopen on the 
ground that she did not receive proper notice of the deportation 
hearing.94  Upholding the application of the departure bar, the IJ denied 
respondent’s motion on January 17, 2008.95 
                                                                                                                                      
(2006) (imposing a physical presence requirement in the United States for domestic 
violence victims for filing motions to reopen or reconsider). 
 85 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
 86 Petitioner Armendarez-Mendez violated the regulatory filing deadline by 
submitting the motion at issue nearly fifteen months late.  Id. at 647.  Therefore, 
reaching the issue of whether the departure bar was valid was not necessary to the 
court’s conclusion.  See id.  
 87 Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Armendarez-Mendez, 
24 I & N. Dec. at 653–60). 
 88 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
 89 25 I. & N. Dec. 57, 60 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 57. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.  
 95 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 58.  Respondent then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, but the IJ denied that motion as well.  Id. 
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The Board read 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(g) as presupposing the existence of 
an outstanding order for deportation as the basis on which an alien’s 
“self-deportation” may deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the 
alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider.96  Examining the specific 
language used in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2),97 the Board 
focused on the usage of the term “rescinded” and noted that the term 
“rescind” means “to annul ab initio”98 when dealing with an in absentia 
deportation order.99  The Board then ruled that “[a]n in absentia 
deportation order issued in proceedings of which the respondent had 
no notice is voidable from its inception and becomes a legal nullity 
upon its rescission, with the result that the respondent reverts to the 
same immigration status that he . . . possessed prior to entry of the 
order.”100  Ultimately, the Board concluded, as did the Eleventh Circuit 
in Contreras-Rodriguez v. United States Attorney General,101 “that an in 
absentia deportation order does not so qualify if it was issued in a 
proceeding of which the alien did not properly receive notice.”102 
The above-referenced cases illustrate the lack of predictability 
and uniformity in the BIA’s decisions.103  Despite having a long history 
of upholding the regulatory departure bars, the BIA has recently begun 
modifying its jurisprudence in this area of the law.  As noted, the BIA 
                                                          
 96 Id. at 59. 
 97 Regarding exceptions to filing deadlines, the regulation provides in relevant 
part: 
(A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be 
rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed: 
. . . .  
(2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive 
notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state 
custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (2011). 
 98 See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 353 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1306 (6th ed. 1990) (“‘[R]escission’ means to annul ab initio.”)).  “Ab initio” 
is a Latin term meaning “[f]rom the beginning.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (7th ed. 
1999).   
 99 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59. 
 100 Id.  
 101 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006).  See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
646, 654 n.6 (B.I.A. 2008) (reserving decision on this issue). 
 102 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59.  Finally, the Board remanded the 
matter to the IJ to allow him to decide whether the respondent’s in absentia 
deportation order was subject to rescission for lack of proper notice.  Id. at 60. 
 103 See David Isaacson, Filing and Adjudication of Motions to Reopen and Reconsider 
After Departure From the United States, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCS., PLLC IMMIGRATION & 
NATIONALITY LAW (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.cyrusmehta.com/News.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus201091310474&Month=&Fr
om=Menu&Page=19&Year=All (“Recent caselaw . . . indicates that this rule is not as 
uniform as many had previously supposed.”). 
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deviated slightly from its longstanding practice of upholding the 
regulatory departure bar in In re Bulnes-Nolasco, which may suggest 
that the BIA is willing to assess the validity of departure bars 
separately in different contexts.104 
V. DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales 
Tunbosun Olawale William (“William”), a native and citizen of 
Nigeria, became a legal permanent resident of the United States in 
1996.105  One year later, a Maryland court sentenced William to prison 
and probation after he pled guilty to receipt of a stolen credit card in 
violation of Maryland law.106  Then, in November 1997, “the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘INS’) charged William with 
being removable as an aggravated felon for committing an offense 
involving fraud or deceit” and subsequently “charged William with 
being removable as having committed a crime of moral turpitude.”107  
Ultimately, an IJ found William removable based on his conviction of a 
crime of moral turpitude and ineligible for relief.108  The BIA affirmed 
the IJ’s decision and William did not seek further review in the Fourth 
Circuit.109  Government officials then removed William from the United 
States in July 2005.110 
Shortly after removal, William filed a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis111 in state court seeking to vacate his Maryland conviction.112  In 
October 2005, the state court granted William’s writ and vacated his 
conviction.113  Then, in December 2005, “William filed a motion to 
reopen immigration proceedings before the BIA” based on the 
exceptional circumstances of his case.114  The BIA denied his motion by 
                                                          
 104 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 60; see infra Part IV.C. 
 105 William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 106 Id.  The court sentenced William “to eighteen months imprisonment, with nine 
months suspended and three years probation.”  Id. 
 107 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 108 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 109 Id.  William did, however, file a motion to reconsider with the BIA whereby he 
argued “that he had received limited post-conviction relief in the form of a reduction of 
sentence.”  Id.  The BIA denied this motion and, once again, William did not pursue 
further review in the Fourth Circuit.  Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009) (“The writ of coram 
nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed to correct errors of fact.”). 
 112 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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holding that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the 
court of jurisdiction to consider William’s motion because he had 
already been removed from the country.115  At this point, William 
petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the BIA’s application of the 
departure bar.116  William primarily argued that “the post-departure 
bar on motions to reopen[] is invalid because it conflicts with clear 
statutory language.”117  The government, however, argued that the 
statute is “silent with respect to post-departure motions to reopen in 
that it does not specifically address them,” and therefore the Attorney 
General’s regulations appropriately filled the gap.118 
Judge Shedd, writing for the majority, used the Chevron119 analysis 
to determine the validity of the Agency’s regulation.120  Beginning with 
the statutory provision, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) 
provides that “‘[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings 
under this section.’”121  Given its precise language, which explicitly 
provides for a temporal limitation but also specifically removes the 
prior codified geographical limitation, the court found that “§ 
1229a(c)(7)(A) unambiguously provides an alien with the right to file 
one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is within or without 
the country.”122  Thus, the Fourth Circuit foreclosed the government’s 
argument that the statute “is silent with respect to post-departure 
motions to reopen.”123 
Additionally, the court found that the “clarity and breadth of the 
statutory language likewise overc[a]me the Government’s argument 
that . . . Congress codified the right to file a motion to reopen while 
leaving the regulatory post-departure bar in place by not expressly 
                                                          
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 331.  William argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) grants the right to 
reopen without regard to an alien’s physical presence in the country.  See id. at 332.  
This, he argued, conflicted with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which limits the right based on the 
alien’s physical presence in the country.  See id. at 331–32. 
 118 William, 499 F.3d at 332. 
 119 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Under the 
Chevron doctrine, a court must first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”  Id. at 842.  If so, the inquiry ends because both the court 
and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  
Id. at 842–43.  On the other hand, if Congress has not addressed the question at issue, 
the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843. 
 120 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 121 Id. at 332 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(2006)).  For the text of the current 
departure bar see infra Part VII. 
 122 William, 499 F.3d at 332. 
 123 Id. 
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repealing it.”124  According to the court, Congress clearly addressed and 
“at least implicitly repealed” the departure bar when it decided to 
grant “an alien” the right to move to reopen without further specifying 
a physical presence requirement.125  Moreover, the court noted that the 
government’s argument also lacked contextual support because “one of 
IIRIRA’s aims is to expedite the removal of aliens from the country 
while permitting them to continue to seek review of their removal 
orders from abroad.”126 
The majority found that the overall structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
reinforced its interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7)(A) in two ways.127  First, 
Congress’s specific limitations on the right to file a motion to reopen 
supports the conclusion that § 1229a(c)(7)(A) cannot be read to 
exclude aliens who have departed the country.128  Second, for motions 
to reopen for victims of domestic violence under § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV),129 Congress expressly included a physical 
presence requirement.130  Thus, the court drew a negative inference 
that, by not requiring physical presence in the statutory language of § 
1229a(c)(7)(A), Congress did not intend to limit such motions to 
reopen to aliens who have not departed the country.131  Further, the 
court also noted that if Congress had intended the departure bar to 
apply to all motions, the express language requiring physical presence 
for victims of domestic violence would be superfluous.132 
                                                          
 124 Id. at n.2. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. at n.3. 
 127 Id. at 333. 
 128 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000) 
(“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have 
authority to create others.  The proper inference . . . is that Congress considered the 
issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth.”). 
 129 The Act states in pertinent part: 
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents.  Any 
limitation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions 
shall not apply. 
 . . . . 
(IV) if the alien is physically present in the United States at the time of 
filing the motion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006). 
 130 See William, 499 F.3d at 333. 
 131 Id.; see Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003) (“[Where] Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 132 See William, 499 F.3d at 333; see, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 
(2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon 
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The majority concluded that congressional intent was 
unequivocal: “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) clearly and unambiguously grants an 
alien the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is 
present in the United States when the motion is filed.”133  Therefore, 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is in direct conflict with the clear language of the 
statute; the INA thereby removes any authority from the regulation 
and renders it invalid.134 
Chief Judge Williams dissented.135  The Chief Judge’s primary 
disagreements with the majority’s analysis were that Congress’s 
statutory language did not repeal the regulatory departure bar and 
that the majority never engaged in the second step of the Chevron 
analysis.136  Unlike the majority, the dissent could not get a “‘clear 
sense of congressional intent’ to repeal the departure bar simply 
because the numerical limitation on motions to reopen now occupies a 
place in the United States Code where previously it only existed in the 
Federal Register.”137  Chief Judge Williams further noted that, when 
viewed in its entirety, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) makes clear that the 
statute is nothing more than a numerical limitation on an alien’s ability 
to file a motion to reopen immigration proceedings.138  Moreover, the 
dissent pointed out that Congress did not add the domestic violence 
exception’s physical presence requirement to § 1229a until 2000—
nearly a decade after IIRIRA’s enactment.139 
                                                                                                                                      
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word 
shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”). 
 133 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“If the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we need 
not inquire further.”).  
 134 William, 499 F.3d at 334; see Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“[W]e must overturn a regulation that clearly conflicts with the plain text of the 
statute.”). 
 135 William, 499 F.3d at 334 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. at 335 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 
(2004)). 
 138 See id. at 336; see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“We do not . 
. . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”). 
 139 William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting); see Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.  According to 
Chief Judge Williams, this Act sought to “snuff out sex slave trade and domestic 
violence,” which is “connected neither in time nor purpose” to the IIRIRA amendments 
regarding motions to reopen.  William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).  
Chief Judge Williams countered the “negative inference” argument by stating that 
“Congress is presumed to have known about and approved of the departure bar when 
it amended the INA without explicitly repealing it.”  Id. at 338–41 (Williams, C.J., 
dissenting).   
  118 
Under Chief Judge Williams’s own analysis of Chevron’s first step, 
he concluded that the statute is silent, and the agency is empowered by 
statute to issue regulations to dispel the silence.140  The Judge then 
proceeded to Chevron’s second step.141  Chief Judge Williams concluded 
that the Attorney General’s reasoning that the goal of achieving finality 
in immigration matters outweighs the burdens associated with 
adjudicating motions to reopen filed on behalf of departed or removed 
aliens is reasonable enough to defer to the Attorney General and thus 
uphold the regulation.142 
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Mendiola v. Holder 
Prior to the release of the Mendiola decision, but after briefing, the 
Tenth Circuit decided Rosillo-Puga v. Holder.  Finding the case 
analogous to Mendiola’s, the Mendiola court relied heavily on the 
precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga.143 
1. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder 
In 2003, an IJ ordered Rosillo-Puga removed to Mexico.144  Three 
years later he filed a motion to reopen his proceedings with the IJ on 
the ground that the court could exercise sua sponte jurisdiction under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)145 to consider his motion.146  The IJ denied 
Rosillo-Puga’s motion, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding 
that § 1003.23(b)(1) deprived the IJ of jurisdiction to hear Rosillo-
Puga’s motion to reopen proceedings because he had already departed 
the country.147 
Rosillo-Puga relied upon William v. Gonzales in making his 
argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) permits “an alien” to file one 
                                                          
 140 See William, 499 F.3d at 342 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
 141 Chevron’s second step requires the court to determine whether the regulation is 
“reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design” in order to uphold the agency’s 
interpretation.  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 142 See id. at 345; Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) 
(explaining that deference to an agency’s construction of a statute is “especially 
[appropriate] where such construction has been long continued”); William, 499 F.3d. at 
345 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
 143 See Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 144 Id. at 1306 (citation omitted). This Part of the Comment focuses mainly on the 
Mendiola court’s iteration of the facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga.  Rosillo-Puga, 580 
F.3d 1147.  It is the author’s position that the precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga is 
better understood through the Mendiola court’s iteration of Rosillo-Puga’s facts and 
holding. 
 145 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her 
own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”); see infra Part VII. 
 146 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306–07. 
 147 Id. at 1307. 
  119 
motion to reopen regardless of whether that alien is inside or outside 
the United States.148  The Rosillo-Puga court, however, disagreed with 
the majority’s opinion in William and instead reached the same 
conclusion that was articulated in Chief Judge Williams’s dissent.149  As 
the court did in William, the Rosillo-Puga court applied the two-step 
Chevron test to review the Agency’s construction of the statute at 
issue.150  First, the court analyzed Congress’s statutory language and 
found that it was “‘simply silent on the issue of whether it meant to 
repeal the post-departure bars contained in the Attorney General’s 
regulations.’”151  The court then inquired into “whether the agency’s 
interpretation is ‘based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.’”152  Finding it “inconceivable” for Congress to have repealed 
the regulatory post-departure bar without stating anything about its 
forty-year history in practice, the court upheld the post-departure bar 
as a valid regulation under the ‘“Attorney General’s Congressionally-
delegated rulemaking authority, and [therefore ruled that the bar] 
does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) or (7)(C).”‘153 
The Rosillo-Puga court ultimately upheld the BIA’s holdings that it 
lacked jurisdiction to hear Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that the BIA and IJ lacked sua sponte jurisdiction 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)154 to consider the motion to reopen.155  The 
ruling, however, was not unanimous; Judge Lucero filed a lone 
dissent.156 
                                                          
 148 See id.; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007).  For a 
discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006) see infra Part VII. 
 149 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307. 
 150 Id. at 1307–08; see William, 499 F.3d at 331–32.   
 151 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307–08 (quoting Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 
1157 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152 Id. at 1308 (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1157).   
 153 See id. (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 154 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider 
on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”); see 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An [IJ] may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen 
or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .”). 
 155 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308; see also Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 
675–76 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the interpretation by the BIA that the departure bar 
removes its jurisdiction, including its sua sponte authority, to reopen the removal 
proceedings of a deported alien to be reasonable and upholding the same). 
 156 See Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1161–1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also 
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308 n.5;.  For purposes of developing Judge Lucero’s arguments 
in his dissenting opinion in greater detail from that which is found in the Mendiola 
opinion, this Comment will provide some additional information by analyzing text 
taken directly from Judge Lucero’s dissenting opinion in Rosillo-Puga.   
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Judge Lucero reasoned that a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A) “unambiguously guarantee[s] every alien 
the right to file . . . one motion to reopen removal proceedings, 
regardless of whether the alien has departed from the United 
States.”157  According to the dissent, Congress’s use of inclusive 
language in the terms “the alien” and “an alien” indicated Congress’s 
intent not to exclude a subclass of aliens—those who have departed 
and are thus outside the INA’s scope.158  Judge Lucero also found, as did 
the majority in William, that the textual contrast between the domestic 
violence section of the statute, which explicitly imposes a physical 
presence requirement, and other sections of the statute that do not, 
illustrates Congress’s intent not to place geographical limitations on all 
motions to reopen or reconsider.159  Such a reading, the dissent noted, 
would render the physical presence requirement under the domestic 
violence section “mere surplusage.”160 
2. Mendiola v. Holder 
Eddie Mendiola, a native and citizen of Peru, became a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States in April 1989.161  In July 1996 
and August 2000, a California state court convicted Mendiola of 
possession of steroids.162  Subsequently, an Idaho state court convicted 
Mendiola of being an accessory to a felony in September 2003.163  
Thereafter, DHS officials detained and transported Mendiola to an 
immigration detention facility in Colorado.164  The DHS then 
                                                          
 157 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1162 (Lucero, J., dissenting).  Under a different 
approach, Judge Lucero noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dada v. 
Mukasey “‘supports the conclusion that the post-departure bar is inconsistent with’ the 
statute because it ‘held all aliens have a statutory right to file one motion to reopen’ 
pursuant to § 1229a(c)(7).”  Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1168 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see 
Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 22 (2008) (stating that a “more expeditious solution” to 
the problem would be to permit aliens to file motions to reopen after they have left the 
country) (decided on other grounds). 
 158 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1164 (Lucero, J., dissenting).  
 159 Id. at 1165; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 160 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1165 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting William, 499 F.3d 
at 333).  
 161 Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 162 Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2010).  On July 30, 1996, a 
California state court convicted Mendiola of misdemeanor possession in violation of a 
state law.  Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.  Then, on August 7, 2000, the court convicted 
him of felony possession.  Id. 
 163 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 164 Id. 
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commenced removal proceedings against Mendiola on grounds that he 
was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.165 
Mendiola moved for a change of venue from the Tenth Circuit to 
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that his underlying conviction occurred in 
California and thus his case should fall within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.166  The IJ denied a change of venue, applied Tenth Circuit 
law, found that Mendiola was removable based upon his aggravated 
felony conviction, and ordered him removed to Peru.167  The BIA 
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Mendiola’s appeal.168  The BIA 
noted that the IJ properly applied Tenth Circuit law because “there 
[wa]s no reason to believe that the Tenth Circuit would apply Ninth 
Circuit law to determine [Mendiola’s] removability simply because 
[his] criminal conviction occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Ninth Circuit.”169 
Mendiola then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review.170  While 
his petition was pending, government officials removed Mendiola to 
Peru in March 2005.171  The court then denied Mendiola’s petition.172  
Within two years, Mendiola returned to the United States illegally.173  
In 2007, Mendiola filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA while he 
was in federal custody for his illegal return.174  The BIA denied his 
motion on two grounds: (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the BIA of 
jurisdiction to consider the motion, and (2) Mendiola’s motion was 
untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the expiration of 
the ninety-day limit imposed by § 1003.2(c)(2).175  Mendiola filed 
another petition in 2007.176  The BIA similarly denied this petition.177 
                                                          
 165 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining aggravated felony to include 
a “drug-trafficking crime”), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (pertaining to removability).  
 166 See Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id.(citing United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying 
Tenth Circuit law when deciding if conviction in a state outside Tenth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction constituted aggravated felony); see also Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 
(10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(same)). 
 170 Id. at 811.   
 171 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 172 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 815.  
 173 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.  Shortly after Mendiola illegally returned to the 
United States, federal agents detained him on a charge of reentry after removal for an 
aggravated felony.  Id.  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). 
 174 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 175 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011) (“[A] party may file only one motion to 
reopen . . . proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that 
motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final 
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In 2008, Mendiola obtained new counsel and filed a second 
motion to reopen his proceedings on grounds that his former 
attorney’s ineffectiveness and the California court’s reduction of his 
second conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor in 2007 rendered it 
appropriate.178  The BIA denied Mendiola’s second motion to reopen, 
holding again that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that it also lacked authority to reopen the 
matter sua sponte under § 1003.2(a).179  In addition, the BIA found that 
Mendiola’s motion was deniable due to its untimeliness and to the 
numerical limitation placed on motions to reopen under § 
1003.2(c)(2).180  Undeterred, Mendiola once again filed a petition for 
review with the Tenth Circuit, which the court ultimately granted.181 
Circuit Judge Baldock, writing for the majority, began the court’s 
analysis with a look at the history of the post-departure bar in the 
United States and the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996.182  The court noted 
that “for fifty years the BIA has consistently followed this 
‘jurisdictional principle,’ holding ‘that reopening is unavailable to any 
alien who departs the United States after being ordered removed.’”183  
After discussing the pertinent facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga, the 
court focused its attention on Mendiola’s primary arguments.  
Mendiola argued that the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his motion to reopen.184  
He also argued that “Rosillo-Puga did not extend the post-departure 
bar’s application to motions to reopen filed by aliens pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) where the motion alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel rising to the level of a due process violation.”185 
The court relied on Rosillo-Puga’s precedential effect to counter 
both arguments.186  First, the court, in accordance with stare decisis 
                                                                                                                                      
administrative decision was rendered . . .”).  Mendiola’s final administrative order of 
removal was issued in 2004.  Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 176 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.  
 177 Id.  Mendiola failed to argue in his briefs that § 1003.2(d) did not apply to his 
case.  Mendiola v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 719, 722 (10th Cir. 2008).   
 178 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 179 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or 
reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). 
 180 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305–06; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (containing similar language involving a ninety-day limit).   
 181 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. (quoting In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (B.I.A. 2008)). 
 184 Id. at 1304.  
 185 Id. at 1309; see § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011).  
 186 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1310. 
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principles, upheld the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that § 1003.2(d) 
was valid.187  Second, finding that the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) 
“mirrors” the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which the Rosillo-Puga 
court addressed, the Mendiola court applied the same analysis to the 
present matter.188 
The court then iterated the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that 
“Congress’s provision for one motion to reopen within 90 days of 
removal in those statutory subsections does not alter the valid 
continued operation of the regulatory post-departure bar to motions to 
reopen.”189  The court then noted that the departure bar divested the 
BIA and IJ of jurisdiction in Rosillo-Puga under a similar regulatory 
departure bar and also specified that the court is “bound by the 
precedent.”190  Thus, the court held that the departure bar applied to 
Mendiola.191 
C. Additional Applications of the Departure Bar in the Federal 
Circuits 
As the case summaries above have shown, case law “indicates 
[that] this rule is not as uniform as many had previously supposed.”192  
“[A] substantial number of Court of Appeals and BIA cases have opened 
up the possibility that certain aliens may be able to file or pursue 
motions to reopen and reconsider even after departing from the United 
States.”193  To illustrate the disparities in departure bar jurisprudence 
in different areas of the country, this Comment will now consider a 
sample of pertinent circuit cases. 
1. The First Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s 
Validity 
In Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, the First Circuit held that the departure 
bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) was a valid jurisdictional limitation on 
an IJ’s authority to consider a departed alien’s motion to reopen or 
reconsider proceedings.194  The First Circuit’s jurisdiction includes 
                                                          
 187 Id.; see Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1156 (2009).  
 188 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1309–10. 
 189 Id. (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156).   
 190 Id. at 1310.  
 191 Id. 
 192 Isaacson, supra note 103. 
 193 Id.  
 194 489 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 
650, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Pena court rejected “the argument that the 
departure bar was impliedly repealed by the [IIRIRA]”); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 
329, 345 n.6 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
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Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode 
Island.195  Therefore, a departed alien whose removal proceedings have 
taken place or are taking place within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction 
will be barred from filing a motion to reopen the proceedings. 
2. The Second Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict 
Its Congressionally-Given Jurisdiction 
In Zhang v. Holder, the Second Circuit upheld as reasonable the 
BIA’s decision to bar the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal 
proceedings seeking the court’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(a) because of the particular historical evolution of the 
regulation and because the alien had departed the country.196  More 
specifically, the court upheld as “not plainly erroneous” the BIA’s 
interpretation that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprives the Board of 
jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte.197  In 
2011, however, the Second Circuit revisited the departure bar issue 
and reached a different result in Luna v. Holder.198  While following an 
approach similar to the Sixth199 and Seventh Circuits’,200 the court in 
Luna held that the “BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress 
gave it by applying the departure bar regulation [under] 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) . . . to statutory motions to reopen.”201  According to the 
court, Congress did not make jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7) dependent upon whether an alien is present within the 
United States.202  Rather, the IIRIRA repealed the statutory bar to 
departed aliens that had already been in place.203  Ultimately, the court 
held that “the BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise 
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.”204  Thus, a 
departed alien who was subject to or is subject to removal proceedings 
                                                          
 195 See Court Locator, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).  
 196 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 661. 
 197 Id. at 652. 
 198 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 199 See discussion infra Part V.C.6. 
 200 See discussion infra Part V.C.7. 
 201 Luna, 637 F.3d at 100. 
 202 Id. at 101. 
 203 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996). 
 204 Luna, 637 F.3d at 102.  The court declined, however, to determine the validity of 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in every possible context.  Id.  Thus, it is not clear how the court 
will rule on an issue regarding the regulatory sua sponte motion to reopen.   
  125 
in Connecticut, New York, or Vermont is not barred from filing a 
statutory motion to reopen.205 
3. The Third Circuit Holds Post-Departure Bar Conflicts 
with Clear Congressional Intent 
In an unpublished opinion in 2009, the Third Circuit upheld the 
validity of the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), 
pertaining to motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA.206  In 
2010, the Third Circuit held the BIA’s interpretation of the regulatory 
departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e)207 to be incorrect because the 
Board equated the word “departure” with “deportation” and/or 
“remov[al].”208  In its decision, the court noted that although an alien 
who voluntarily departs during deportation proceedings may be 
deemed to have waived his or her right to appeal, “it is less equitable to 
so deem an alien who was involuntarily removed . . . .”209 
More recently, the Third Circuit unequivocally held that “the post-
departure bar regulation [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)] conflicts with 
Congress’[s] clear intent for several reasons.”210  Those reasons 
included, among others, that the “plain text of the statute provides each 
‘alien’ with the right to file one motion to reopen”; that Congress 
incorporated geographical limitations in a subsequent addition to the 
IIRIRA but did not add a geographical limitation to the overall statute 
generally; and that “Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-
departure bar to judicial review in conformity with IIRIRA’s purpose of 
speeding departure, but improving accuracy.”211  The Third Circuit’s 
jurisdiction includes Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.212  
Therefore, aliens whose judicial proceedings took place in these states 
                                                          
 205 The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, 
supra note 195. 
 206 Tahiraj-Dauti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 323 F. App’x 138, 139 (3d Cir. 2009); see infra 
text accompanying note 265. 
 207 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (“Departure from the United States of a person who 
is the subject of deportation proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from a 
decision in his or her case, shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.”). 
 208 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 394 F. App’x 941, 944–55 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 209 Id. at 945 (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (pertaining to 
waivers of appeal). 
 210 Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although this case 
dealt specifically with the motion-to-reconsider portion of the regulation, the court 
noted that the analysis for the motion to reopen is the same and thus if one portion is 
invalid, the other is as well.  Id. at 217 n.3.   
 211 Id. at 224. 
 212 See Court Locator, supra note 195. 
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will not be jurisdictionally barred solely because they have filed 
motions to reopen after departing the United States. 
4. The Fourth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure Bars 
Are Always Invalid 
As noted in greater detail above,213 the Fourth Circuit holds that 
the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) clearly conflicts 
with the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and therefore 
is rendered invalid.214  Thus, an alien who faces removal proceedings in 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia is 
not jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider 
solely because the alien has departed the country.215 
5. The Fifth Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s 
Validity 
In 2003, the Fifth Circuit in Ovalles v. Holder ruled that the BIA’s 
decision—that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived the 
BIA of the jurisdiction to sua sponte consider a motion to reopen filed 
by an alien who has departed the country following termination of 
removal proceedings—was proper.216  More recently, the court directly 
ruled on the regulatory departure bar’s validity in Toora v. Holder.217  
In Toora, the court held that the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) “applied to an alien who departed the U.S. after 
receiving notice of his deportation proceeding, but before the 
proceeding was completed and the [IJ] entered a deportation order.”218  
Thus, individuals whose removal proceedings have already been 
terminated and individuals who are presently subject to removal 
proceedings in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas, and have departed the 
                                                          
 213 See supra Part V.A. 
 214 William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 215 The Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 195. 
 216 577 F.3d 288, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no need to squarely address the 
validity of § 1003.2(d) because the motion to reopen was untimely); see Navarro-
Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d)—
the predecessor to § 1003.2(d)—as a valid restriction on the BIA’s jurisdiction to hear 
an alien’s motion to reopen once that alien has departed the United States).  See 
generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder: Better Late than . . . on Time? The 
Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1347 
(discussing how the Fifth Circuit avoided directly addressing the validity of the 
departure bar at issue). 
 217 603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 218 Toora v. Holder, No. 09-60073, FINDLAW (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:03 PM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fifth_circuit/2010/ 
04/toora-v-holder-no-09-60073.html (discussing Toora, 603 F.3d at 288). 
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United States either after completion of their removal proceedings or 
prior to an official removal order, will be barred from moving to 
reopen or reconsider their proceedings.219 
6. The Sixth Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict Its 
Jurisdiction to Hear Statutorily Created Motions to 
Reopen 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit simply noted in a footnote in Ablahad v. 
Gonzales that petitioner’s “motions to reopen were also barred by 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1).”220 Two years later, however, 
the court addressed the particular matter at issue in Madrigal v. Holder 
with finality when it held that the departure bar rule under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.4221 does not apply to aliens who have been involuntarily 
removed from the United States.222  In 2011, the Sixth Circuit resolved 
all of the outstanding issues concerning the departure bar’s application 
in Pruidze v. Holder, where the court held that the BIA cannot curtail its 
own jurisdiction to entertain a departed alien’s motion to reopen.223  
First, the court explicitly stated that “no statute gives the [BIA] 
purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reopen 
filed by aliens who have left the country.”224  Second, the court 
explained that a line of recent Supreme Court decisions makes clear 
that the BIA’s authority is to interpret the regulation as a mandatory 
legal rule and not as jurisdictional.225  Absent a statute providing the 
BIA with such authority, “the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to 
handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”226  
Thus, the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived it of 
jurisdiction to entertain Pruidze’s motion.227  It follows that an alien 
                                                          
 219 The Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 195. 
 220 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 221 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2011) (pertaining to withdrawal of appeal). 
 222 572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009); see Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold 
departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily removed aliens).  Involuntary removal 
entails a government-induced removal.  See Coyt v. Holder, 595 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he physical removal of a petitioner by the United States does not preclude 
the petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.”). 
 223 632 F.3d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 224 Id. at 237. 
 225 Id. at 238 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009); Bowles v. Russell, 551 
U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443 (2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)). 
 226 Id. at 239. 
 227 Id. at 241. 
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whose removal proceedings took place in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, or 
Tennessee and has since departed the country voluntarily or 
involuntarily may file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings.228 
7. The Seventh Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict 
Its Jurisdiction 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is similar to the Sixth Circuit’s.  In 
Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit struck down the 
departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as invalid because an agency 
is not entitled to “contract its own jurisdiction by regulations or by 
decisions in litigated proceedings.”229  Thus, “until the BIA rethinks the 
theoretical basis for the departure bar . . . motions to reopen . . . will 
survive an alien’s departure in the Seventh Circuit as well.”230  It 
follows that aliens who are or were subjected to removal proceedings 
in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, have since departed the country, and 
wish to move to reopen their removal proceedings are not 
jurisdictionally barred simply due to the regulatory departure bar’s 
physical presence requirement.231 
9. The Ninth Circuit Holds the Regulatory Departure Bar 
Inapplicable to Involuntarily Removed Aliens 
In 2007, the Lin v. Gonzales232 court relied “on the rule of lenity to 
hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not deprive an IJ of jurisdiction 
to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien” so long as the 
regulation is explicitly phrased in the present tense.233  Subsequently, 
the Ninth Circuit held in Coyt v. Holder that the regulatory departure 
bar rule is not applicable to aliens who were involuntarily removed 
from the United States.234  More recently, in Reyes-Torres v. Holder, the 
                                                          
 228 The Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 195. 
 229 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We think that Union Pacific is dispositive in 
favor of the holding in William—though on a rationale distinct from the [F]ourth 
[C]ircuit’s.”); Union Pac. R.R., 130 S. Ct. 584; see also ROSENBLOOM ET AL., supra note 3, at 
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jurisdictional, and thus, the BIA cannot decline a motion to reopen on that ground). 
 230 See Isaacson, supra note 103. 
 231 The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, 
supra note 195. 
 232 Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 233 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Lin, 473 F.3d at 982).  
 234 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) “cannot 
apply to cause the withdrawal of an administrative petition filed by a petitioner who 
has been involuntarily removed . . . .”); see Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594 (noting 
that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold departure bars inapplicable to 
involuntarily removed aliens).  See generally Susan Kilgore, Developments in the Judicial 
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court upheld its ruling in Coyt and reiterated that Congress’s intent in 
enacting IIRIRA is clear: “‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would 
be able to pursue relief after departing from the United States.’”235  In 
particular, the court held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) did not deprive the 
BIA of jurisdiction to entertain Reyes-Torres’s motion to reopen his 
case after being removed from the United States.236  Thus, the 
departure bar’s physical presence requirement is clearly inapplicable 
in cases where removal proceedings have been completed and the 
alien has been removed.  The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction includes 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Washington.237 
10. The Tenth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure Bars 
Are Always Valid 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to departure-bar case law is in 
direct contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s.  In Mendiola v. Holder, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not 
conflict with the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and 
therefore is a valid regulation applicable to departed aliens.238  The 
court recently upheld the departure bar’s validity once again in 
Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder.239  In Contreras-Bocanegra, the court 
held that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) divested the BIA 
of jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen despite the 
timeliness of said motion because the motion was filed after petitioner 
departed the country.240  Therefore, an alien who faces removal 
proceedings in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, or 
Wyoming is jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or 
reconsider after departing from the United States.241 
                                                                                                                                      
Branch: Ninth Circuit Issues Decision in Coyt v. Holder, Invalidating Departure Bar on 
Motions to Reopen and Creating Circuit Split, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383 (2010). 
 235 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 236 Id. at 1077. 
 237 See Court Locator, supra note 195. 
 238 585 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 239 629 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010).    
 240 Id. at 1171–72. 
 241 See Court Locator, supra note 195. 
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11. The Eleventh Circuit Upholds the Regulatory Departure 
Bar as Valid 
Sankar v. United States Attorney General is an unpublished opinion 
addressing the applicability of the regulatory departure bar.242  
Ultimately, the court in Sankar specifically upheld the departure bar in 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) as applied to motions to reopen or reconsider 
before an IJ.243  If the court’s analysis does not change, aliens who were 
or are subject to removal proceedings in Alabama, Florida, or Georgia, 
and have since departed will not be permitted to file motions to reopen 
or reconsider.244 
11. The Varying Approaches of the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
The aforementioned cases illustrate the lack of consistency in the 
courts’ application of the departure bar and the recent trend among 
the circuit courts of appeals of invalidating regulatory post-departure 
bars.  More importantly, the cases also highlight the nuances in 
different circuit holdings of how narrowly or broadly the provisions 
are interpreted.  Such concerns indicate a need for change in this 
context.  The needed change, however, will require either a Supreme 
Court ruling or an amendment to the INA’s statutory language. 
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR MODIFICATION OR ABOLISHMENT OF THE REGULATORY 
DEPARTURE BAR 
As evidenced throughout this Comment, there is a lack of 
uniformity among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals’ departure bar 
jurisprudence in the immigration context.  Specifically, the circuit 
courts are divided on the applicability and/or validity of the physical 
presence requirement in the departure bars—these “[‘d]ifferences in 
legal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal treatment of 
citizens . . . solely because of differences in geography.’”245 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (“Study 
Committee”) examined inter-circuit conflicts and “recommended that 
the Federal Judicial Center ‘study the number and frequency of 
unresolved conflicts’ to determine how many were ‘intolerable.’”246  
                                                          
 242 Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 243 Id. at 799. 
 244 See Court Locator, supra note 195. 
 245 Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal 
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The Study Committee’s report defined “intolerable” conflicts in the 
court system to include circumstances when the lack of uniformity 
“‘encourages forum shopping among circuits [or] creates unfairness to 
litigants in different circuits . . . [or] ‘encourages non-acquiescence’ by 
federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to choose between the 
uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to the 
different holdings of courts in different regions.’”247  Given these 
guidelines, the current regulatory departure bar conflicts in the 
different circuits are clearly “intolerable” conflicts. 
Such longstanding conflicts are causes for concern, especially 
considering the existence of Supreme Court Rule 10 (“Rule 10”), which 
provides guidance for the Court’s discretionary power to choose which 
writs of certiorari to grant.248  One guiding principle the Supreme Court 
uses in considering a petition is whether a “[U.S.] court of appeals has 
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another [U.S.] court 
of appeals on the same important matter.”249  Interestingly, at least one 
commentator has said that Rule 10 is partly derived from former 
President and Chief Justice Taft’s vision for the Supreme Court; a vision 
that involved “two broad objectives: (i) to resolve important questions 
of law, and (ii) to maintain uniformity in federal law.”250 
Although one commentator has noted that maintaining uniformity 
in federal law “has fallen by the wayside” since the retirement in 1993 
of Justice White251—who openly advocated that a primary aim of the 
Court is “to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in 
federal law throughout the land”252—it is still an objective the Court 
generally adheres to.  As Justice Scalia noted, “The principal purpose of 
this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law.”253  
Nonetheless, petitioning the Court to resolve an inter-circuit conflict 
                                                          
 247 Id. (quoting FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N REPORT at 124–25).  
 248 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 249 Id. at R. 10(a). 
 250 Kenneth W. Star, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of 
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N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349 (1982). 
 253 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 7 (2008) (“[The Court] granted 
certiorari . . . to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals.”); Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007) (stating that the Court “granted certiorari to 
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does not guarantee that the petition will be granted, but the “likelihood 
that the Court will grant review increases markedly.”254 
Unfortunately, however, some conflicts among the circuits can 
persist for years before the Supreme Court finally decides to hear the 
matter.255  Specifically, in the departure bar context, the Supreme Court 
has rejected certiorari in at least three cases since 2008.256  It is not 
clear at this point whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to 
clarify the matter at issue, especially since “relatively few immigration 
cases are taken up by the Supreme Court.”257 
Additionally, as noted above, lack of uniformity may lead parties, 
both governmental entities as well as private parties, to engage in 
forum shopping, and it certainly fosters less predictability in the law, 
which raises questions of fundamental fairness concerning similarly 
situated persons in different locations being treated differently under 
the same laws.258  Such uncertainty also raises philosophical questions 
about the overall effectiveness of our court system.259  Further, 
uniform application of the law can improve judicial efficiency by 
limiting the amount of resources that courts expend deciphering a 
law’s applicability when different circuits have such varying 
approaches to the same issue. 
First, forum shopping is a practice that our courts greatly 
despise.260  For this reason, courts are encouraged to “consider the 
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and 
                                                          
 254 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: 
Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 KAN. L. REV. 313, 318 
(2009) (citing David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks 
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Constitutionality of Neutral Pronoun Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48 
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 256  Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 
(2010); Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
502 (2010); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 257 Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 27, at 49.  
 258 See supra text accompanying notes 23–27, 29. 
 259 For example, given the importance of maintaining uniformity throughout 
American jurisprudence, as seen in the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Constitution, should changes be made to the American court system so that such inter-
circuit conflicts do not persist for several years? 
 260 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
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avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”261  Litigants, 
however, may undertake such gamesmanship when the legal 
environment provides them with the opportunity to receive a more 
favorable outcome in a different jurisdiction. 
Second, “[l]ack of predictability” is also of great concern; it is 
“detrimental to citizens of foreign countries, citizens of the United 
States, and to the United States as a country.”262  Such unpredictability 
“may frustrate the reasonable expectations of litigants and lead to 
disparate results across the states.”263  Instead, courts should strive to 
achieve predictability because it “helps determine the precedent to 
which a court should adhere, and it ‘encourage[s] reliance on 
adjudication.’”264  In addition, predictability of the law can further 
assist an attorney in advising clients and preparing clients’ cases. 
Third, the current lack of uniformity leads to fundamental 
unfairness in our legal system.  As indicated throughout this Comment, 
an alien who was subject to removal proceedings in state A may be 
unable to file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings, but would be 
permitted to do so if he or she had faced removal proceedings in State 
B.  This is not a situation in which state laws mandate a variation of 
results because different states have different laws or word those laws 
differently.  Rather, this is a situation in which federal statutory law 
and federal regulations are interpreted differently although the 
language contained therein is the same.  As a result, similarly situated 
persons in different areas are not treated the same. 
Finally, judicial efficiency may be improved by increasing 
uniformity in this context.  Courts may be able to save limited 
resources by not having to decipher what exactly the law in each 
circuit is or will be.  Lower courts will have more guidance and clarity 
to rule on issues pertaining to motions filed by departed aliens.  The 
BIA and immigration courts may also experience an improvement in 
efficiency.  As the BIA has explicitly indicated, it will apply the Fourth 
Circuit’s interpretation of departure bar jurisprudence only in the 
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.  Thus, the BIA will continue to rely on its 
own interpretation of the regulatory departure bars in other circuits.  
This practice may lead to more cases being overturned—if the circuit 
                                                          
 261 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 n.2 
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does not agree with the BIA’s approach, as shown in Part VII—which 
results in more litigation and greater use of resources.  Absent a 
Supreme Court ruling on the matter, in order to resolve these 
concerns, Congress should modify the INA’s statutory language or 
abolish regulatory departure bars entirely. 
VII.         MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS 
There are several different ways to modify or amend the language 
in the regulatory departure bars as well as the relevant INA statutes.  
This Part’s objective is to propose a modification or amendment that 
will result in uniformity among the circuits.  For illustrative purposes, 
this Part will use the language contained in the departure bar under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which provides: 
(d) Departure, deportation, or removal.  A motion to reopen or a 
motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person 
who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal 
proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United 
States.  Any departure from the United States, including the 
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a 
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a 
withdrawal of such motion.265 
Similarly, this section will use the language contained in the INA 
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C), which provides: 
(c) Decision and burden of proof. 
. . . . 
(7) Motions to reopen 
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings 
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as 
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(B) Contents. The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that 
will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and 
shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 
(C) Deadline. 
                                                          
 265 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (pertaining to the BIA); see § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011).  
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(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion 
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal.266 
It is evident from the different circuit courts’ holdings that 
modifying the regulatory departure bars will not resolve all of the 
current conflicts.267  As previously indicated, the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the BIA either cannot constrict its 
congressionally-granted jurisdiction or that the regulatory departure 
bars are rendered invalid by the clear language found within the 
pertinent section(s) of the INA.268  Each of the circuits, however, 
acknowledges that the INA’s statutory language is controlling.269  The 
differences lie in how each circuit interprets this language.  Therefore, 
a realistic solution to the current conflicts, absent a Supreme Court 
ruling directly on point, involves amending the INA’s statutory 
language. 
There are two possible modifications that are most reasonable in 
this context: one that includes statutory language requiring a 
geographic presence for all motions to reopen or one that includes 
statutory language explicitly stating that no such geographic presence 
is required.  Beginning with the former, such an amendment could 
include: (1) language contained in current regulatory departure bars, 
in addition to explicit language to include (2) aliens who were the 
subject of removal proceedings, (3) aliens who voluntarily departed 
the country, and (4) aliens who involuntarily departed.  The 
amendment could be structured as follows: 
(7) Motions to reopen. 
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings 
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as 
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is the subject of 
removal proceedings or was the subject of removal proceedings 
wherein a final order had been issued subsequent to his or her 
voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States.  Any 
departure from the United States, including the deportation or 
removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen 
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or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such 
motion. 
. . . . 
(C) Deadline. 
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion 
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal. 
Although such statutory language would resolve the conflicts 
among all of the circuit courts, it would be contrary to Congress’s 
intent of improving the expedition of removing aliens in enacting the 
IIRIRA.270  The court in Coyt explained that the IIRIRA “‘inverted’ 
certain provisions of the INA, encouraging prompt voluntary departure 
and speedy government action, while eliminating prior statutory 
barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”271  The court continued by 
explaining that prior to the IIRIRA “removal of a petitioner from the 
United States precluded courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
petitions for review.”272  Therefore, at the time when orders of final 
removal were pending, aliens were granted automatic stays.273  The 
“IIRIRA changed that by lifting the prior statutory bar over courts 
exercising jurisdiction over departed aliens, removing the automatic 
stay provision upon petition for review, and informing the Attorney 
General that removal need not be deferred.”274  The court in Coyt then 
concluded that “the intent of Congress is clear” in that when Congress 
enacted the IIRIRA it “anticipated that petitioners would be able to 
pursue relief after departing from the United States.”275 
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Additional insights into the IIRIRA’s structural meanings were 
discussed in William v Gonzales.276  The majority in William made clear 
that Congress’s use of the term “alien” does not distinguish between 
aliens within or without the country; that Congress enacted limitations 
in the section at issue, but a geographical limitation for departed aliens 
is not included; and that Congress’s explicit physical requirement 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV)277 would be rendered 
superfluous if Congress already geographically limited motions to 
reopen or reconsider for aliens.278  Therefore, the amendment 
proposed above would be contrary to the IIRIRA’s original purpose. 
Perhaps then the more appropriate method to resolve the lack of 
uniformity without frustrating the IIRIRA’s purpose or congressional 
intent would be an amendment to the statutory language that explicitly 
states that an alien may file one motion to reopen whether he or she 
(1) is the subject of or (2) was the subject of removal proceedings, 
regardless of whether the alien (3) voluntarily or (4) involuntarily 
departed the country.  For example, 
(7) Motions to reopen. 
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings 
under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as 
to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall apply to an alien who is the subject of 
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings or was the subject of 
removal proceedings wherein a final order had been issued 
subsequent to his or her voluntary or involuntary departure from the 
United States.  Any departure from the United States, including the 
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a 
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall not constitute a 
withdrawal of such motion. 
. . . . 
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(C) Deadline. 
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion 
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 
administrative order of removal. 
This approach would essentially abolish the regulatory departure 
bar rule by explicitly stating in the INA’s statutory language that an 
alien who files a motion to reopen or reconsider his or her immigration 
proceedings is not be jurisdictionally barred from doing so solely due 
to the alien’s geographic location.  More importantly, such an 
amendment could bring the needed uniformity in each circuit’s current 
approach to the departure bar’s application in the immigration context.  
To illustrate, the circuits that relied upon the Attorney General’s 
discretionary power to issue regulations as the reason to render such 
departure bars valid would no longer be able to uphold a BIA’s or an 
IJ’s denial of a motion on such jurisdictional grounds.279  In addition, 
the Ninth Circuit would no longer need to distinguish between aliens 
who voluntarily departed the country and those who were 
involuntarily removed.280  Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits would now have clear guidance as to whether the BIA retains 
jurisdiction to consider motions filed by aliens who have departed.281  
Finally, the Third and Fourth Circuits could continue to uphold the 
statute itself as the final word on whether a court has jurisdiction to 
consider a motion to reopen filed by a departed alien.282  Ultimately, 
this amendment or one that is similarly drafted would resolve each of 
the current inter-circuit conflicts while also conforming to 
congressional intent not to impose a geographic limitation. 
Such an amendment would provide uniformity in this 
immigration context that has been nonexistent for many years.  “Given 
that judicial efficiency and finality are important values,”283 the INA’s 
statutory language should be amended to provide greater uniformity 
in this immigration context by explicitly stating that an alien may file a 
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien resides inside or 
outside of the United States.  The longer departure bar jurisprudence 
remains inconsistent, the longer certain parties may fall victim to the 
                                                          
 279 See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010); Toora v. Holder, 603 
F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009); Sankar v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 
438 (1st Cir. 2007).   
 280 See generally Coyt, 593 F.3d 902. 
 281 See generally Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 282 See generally Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); William v. 
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 283 Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996).   
  139 
concerns described in this Comment.  Without a Supreme Court ruling 
on this matter or a modification of the current law, the problems 
detailed above will persist and aliens in certain jurisdictions will 
continue to be removed without the possibility of having their cases 
reheard. 
VIII.     CONCLUSION 
As departure bar jurisprudence currently stands, aliens subject to 
removal proceedings in different areas of the country will face 
different outcomes, not based upon the merits of their cases, but solely 
because of their geographic locations.  Such lack of uniformity presents 
problems in our legal system.  This Comment has outlined a few of 
these problems.  One problem involves governmental agencies, as well 
as private parties, engaging in forum shopping.284  Another problem, 
which common sense dictates, is that such a non-uniform practice 
leads to lack of predictability in the law.  This is probably most 
troublesome in circuits that have yet to directly address the departure 
bar’s validity, as well as circuits where only unpublished, 
nonprecedential decisions have been issued.285  An attorney advising 
his or her client in these jurisdictions has greater difficulty predicting 
what the outcome may be or how the court will interpret the laws that 
are already in place.  Our judicial system should strive to maintain a 
framework devoid of such concerns. 
An amendment to the INA’s statutory language explicitly stating 
that physical presence is not required for departed aliens to file 
motions to reopen their proceedings would provide the clarity that 
circuit courts need in order to reach similar outcomes on identical 
issues.  As such, an amendment to the INA’s statutory language that 
explicitly grants immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an 
alien’s motion to reopen, regardless of whether the alien is within or 
without the country, would both provide uniformity among the 
different circuit courts of appeals and remain true to the IIRIRA’s 
statutory purpose of expediting removal proceedings “while 
eliminating prior statutory barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”286 
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